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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
he use of mines, both at sea and on land, is an aspect of warfare that 
has constantly attracted critical attention, especially as there is a high poten-
tial for indiscriminate outcomes that directly affect parts of the population 
who are entitled to protection from the impact of warfare.  
Naval mines, the subject of this article, are a relatively inexpensive 
weapon and have been deployed in almost every maritime conflict over the 
past century.1 Currently, mines form a key part of the naval weapons inven-
tory of several States, including China and Iran.2 Technological advances 
have resulted in new types of mines being developed since 1907.3 Accord-
ingly, it may be somewhat surprising that there is only one international 
legal instrument that directly purports to regulate naval mine warfare—
1907 Hague Convention VIII4 (Hague VIII)—a Convention that deals with 
mine warfare as it existed over a century ago. This is in contrast with the 
international community’s identification of the deployment of mines in the 
                                                                                                                      
1. For example, mines were used in both World Wars, the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War, the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War, the 2003 Gulf War and during the 2011 Libyan conflict. 
See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Methods and Means of Naval Warfare in Non-International 
Armed Conflicts, in NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CEN-
TURY 211 (Kenneth Watkin & Andrew J. Norris eds., 2012) (Vol. 88, U.S. Naval War Col-
lege International Law Studies). 
2. A comprehensive evaluation of Chinese naval mine warfare capability is provided 
in Andrew S Erikson, Lyle J Goldstein & William S. Murray, Chinese Mine Warfare: A PLA 
Navy ‘Assassin’s Mace’ Capability, 3 CHINA MARITIME STUDIES, no. 3, June 2009, available at 
https://www.usnwc.edu/Publications/Publications.aspx (then China Maritime Study No. 
3 June 2009 hyperlink). A summary of Iranian naval mine warfare capability is provided in 
Fariborz Haghshenass, Iran’s Asymmetric Naval Warfare, WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR 
NEAR EAST POLICY, Policy Focus 87, Sept. 2008, at 16, available at http://www.washington 
institute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus87.pdf. 
3. Types of mines include limpet mines (attached to a vessel’s hull); moored, drifting, 
floating and bottom contact mines; remote controlled mines; and magnetic, acoustic and 
pressure mines. There are also mines with special characteristics such as aerial delivery, 
torpedo propulsion, vertical rising mines, hydrostatic depth control and “daisy-chain” 
mines (although contemporary use of “daisy-chain” mines by naval forces appears to be 
low, there is scope for the use of this mining technique in the form of maritime impro-
vised explosive devices by terrorist organizations).  
4. Convention No. VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact 












land environment as an issue requiring immediate attention—a need that 
has been addressed, in part, by the adoption of the Ottawa Convention in 
1997.5 
 Other articles in this forum consider Hague VIII in detail and demon-
strate that it places only very limited restrictions on the conduct of naval 
mine warfare. The purpose of this article is to identify what additional legal 
rules govern the use of naval mines in international armed conflict (IAC). 
As with other weapons systems, the type of mine used, and the manner in 
which it is used, may clearly affect the legality of its use. It is therefore op-
erationally important to understand the extent of the legal framework 
which applies to naval mine warfare, and the legal and operational implica-
tions that arise beyond the limited restrictions that are provided in Hague 
VIII.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, a scan of academic texts and literature portrays 
an underlying assumption that the only clearly relevant legal regime appli-
cable to the use of naval mines in IACs, as both a matter of treaty and cus-
tomary international law, is the regime in Hague VIII.6 While references are 
made in some of these publications to other treaties that have entered into 
force over the past century which might impact the use of naval mines in 
IACs, it does not appear that detailed consideration of the consolidated 
legal effect from the accumulation of treaty law, judicial decisions and, (if 
applicable) any developments in customary international law, is usually un-
dertaken. This article seeks to address that shortfall.  
The article proceeds in three parts. It begins by assessing jus ad bellum 
constraints on mining, before moving to an examination of the jus in bello, 
with a particular focus on four key law of armed conflict (LOAC) princi-
ples: distinction, proportionality (including precautions), military necessity 
and humanity/unnecessary suffering. The final part considers other signifi-
                                                                                                                      
5. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of 
Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction, Sept. 17, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211 [hereinaf-
ter Ottawa Convention]. 
6. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 75–76 (2d ed. 2010); Howard S. Levie, 1907 Hague 
Convention VIII Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines—Commentary, in 
THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE: A COLLECTION OF AGREEMENTS AND DOCUMENTS 
WITH COMMENTARIES 129, 141–2 (Natalino Ronzitti ed., 1988); HOWARD S. LEVIE, MINE 
WARFARE AT SEA 175 (1992); Shaun Lyons, Naval Operations in the Gulf, in THE GULF WAR 
1990–91 IN INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH LAW 155, 168–69 (Peter Rowe ed., 1993); 
SAN REMO MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO ARMED CONFLICTS AT 













cant legal regimes that may have applicability to the use of naval mines in 
IACs. 
 The provisions of Hague VIII are not, on a strict interpretation, appli-
cable to mines other than automatic submarine contact mines. However, 
the San Remo Manual notes that there are some basic principles which de-
rive from Hague VIII and customary international law that inform the law 
regarding naval mine warfare.7 These key principles are:  
 
 mines may only be used to achieve a legitimate military outcome;  
 belligerents must retain some control over mines they have de-
ployed and/or have the ability to render a mine safe if such control 
is lost; 
 notification of minefields must occur; and  
 the location of a minefield must be recorded so that the area can be 
cleared once hostilities have ceased. 
 
These principles have been reinforced and/or affirmed by the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ) on a number of occasions, including in the 
Corfu Channel,8 Nicaragua9 and Oil Platforms10 cases. Relevant aspects of these 
cases are assessed throughout this article. 
 
II. USE OF NAVAL MINES: JUS AD BELLUM 
 
The prohibition on States threatening or using force under the circum-
stances described in Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations11 
clearly may have implications for the use of naval mines. As the prohibition 
under Article 2(4) extends to both the “threat” and “use” of force, there 
would not need to be an actual deployment of mines for a breach to occur. 
For example, it may be sufficient for a breach to occur when a State threat-
ens to mine the territorial sea of another State during a period when ten-
sion between the two States is heightened (e.g., as part of an IAC pre-
cursor or shaping operations). Whether the threatening State was actually 
capable of carrying out the threat of deploying naval mines would consti-
                                                                                                                      
7. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at 168–76. 
8. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4 (Apr.9). 
9. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 
I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
10. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161 (Nov. 6). 












tute a relevant factor in determining whether Article 2(4) had been 
breached. Taking these circumstances further, the actual deployment of 
naval mines in another State’s territorial sea would, prima facie, result in a 
breach of Article 2(4) unless there was a legitimate basis upon which the 
minelaying had taken place. In this regard, John Norton Moore notes that 
the laying of clandestine mines is no different in terms of being a use of 
force than firing from shore gun positions at passing warships.12 
However, two clear exceptions to the Article 2(4) prohibition do exist 
under international law. The first is when the UN Security Council author-
izes the use of force pursuant to a resolution under Chapter VII, Article 42 
of the Charter, and the second is when a State takes action in self-defense 
under Article 51 or customary international law. If there is Security Council 
authorization for States to take action under a Chapter VII resolution then 
that authorization clearly provides a legal basis upon which naval mines 
could be legitimately deployed (or threats made for their deployment) in 
circumstances that might otherwise be considered unlawful under Article 
2(4). Similarly, if a State deploys naval mines in response to an armed attack 
that has occurred,13 then such use of mines would be lawful either under 
the express provision of Article 51 or as a measure taken by the State pur-
suant to the “inherent” customary international law right that exists for a 
State to defend itself.14 
An additional circumstance when a State might legitimately deploy na-
val mines prior to an IAC occurring is for the purpose of sea area denial 
when tensions are rising in what might be termed the pre-hostilities period. 
This action need not take place in another State’s territorial waters, but 
might occur in the minelaying State’s own national waters (internal, territo-
rial and archipelagic) or in international waters (exclusive economic zones 
and high seas). In these circumstances, the laying of mines might not con-
stitute a use or threat of force against a particular State, but such action 
might nonetheless infringe other rules of international law. For example, as 
                                                                                                                      
12. John Norton Moore, Jus ad Bellum Before the International Court of Justice, 52 VIR-
GINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 903, 918 (2012). 
13. There is some debate regarding whether or not in the post-Charter era there is a 
continuing right of self-defense action that can be taken if an armed attack is “imminent” 
or whether an armed attack must have actually occurred prior to action in self-defense 
being taken. See id. at 913. 
14. By characterizing the debate in this way, questions regarding whether Article 51 of 
the UN Charter has displaced the customary international law right for a State to use force 














is discussed below, the deployment of naval mines in this context would 
interfere with other States’ exercise of navigational freedoms on the high 
seas or EEZ, or the more limited right of innocent passage in territorial 
waters.15  
As the primary focus of this article is not on the use of naval mines as 
part of the jus ad bellum, attention will now turn to issues that arise in con-
sidering the use of naval mines in situations where an international armed 
conflict has occurred—the jus in bello. 
 
III.  USE OF NAVAL MINES: JUS IN BELLO 
  
It is necessary to consider whether LOAC precludes—or permits—the use 
of naval mines as either a means (i.e., type of weapon) or method (i.e., the 
manner in which an armed conflict is conducted) of warfare.16 In answering 
this question, it may be easy at first to simply agree with the proposition 
that there have not been any challenges to the “lawfulness of the use of 
mines, including those other than the contact type, provided that the gen-
eral principles deducible from [Hague] Convention VIII are respected.”17 
However, there are some nuances to this proposition that should be exam-
ined in order to fully assess its validity. To do so, weapons law, the four 
basic LOAC principles—distinction, proportionality (including precau-
tions), military necessity and humanity/unnecessary suffering—and perfidy, 
as well as other legal regimes that apply during IACs, are considered.  
First, however, some general observations on the applicability of Addi-
tional Protocol I18 (AP I) to naval warfare are required. Whether or not AP 
I applies to naval mines has generated some debate. According to Bothe, 
for example, “the question of naval mines is . . . not regulated by the Pro-
                                                                                                                      
15. See Levie, 1907 Hague Convention VIII, supra note 6, at 141; United Nations Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea arts. 17–19, 87, Dec. 9, 1984, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
LOSC]. 
16. The requirements that arise from the deployment of naval mines in blockade and 
the use of zones, are not discretely examined here. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, 
at 176–83. 
17. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR (1980–1988) AND THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 5 (Andrea 
de Guttry & Natalino Ronzitti eds., 1993). 
18. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 












tocol”;19 a view that appears to be supported in 1992 by Levie.20 Others 
may agree with the view taken in 1984 by Rauch that AP I does have ap-
plicability, although not to the extent that Rauch feared when he stated that 
“naval staffs might be faced with unsurmountable difficulties to chart any 
effective mine warfare compatible with Protocol I.”21 Although perhaps 
standing into danger by raising this subject at all, and without wishing to 
embark on a voyage that would inflame the “famous dispute between Mey-
rowitz and Rauch” as it has been so eloquently described by one noted 
commentator,22 it is asserted that the applicability of aspects of AP I to na-
val mine warfare, in so far as those aspects represent customary interna-
tional law, is a relevant consideration.  
AP I Article 49(3) contains provisions on the protection of civilians 
that may be relevant to naval mines: 
  
The provisions of this Section apply to any land, air or sea warfare which 
may affect the civilian population, individual civilians or civilian objects 
on land. They further apply to all attacks from the sea or from the air 
against objectives on land but do not otherwise affect the rules of interna-
tional law applicable in armed conflict at sea or in the air. 
 
The immediate effect of Article 49(3) is to exclude the section of AP I that 
deals with the “General Protection of the Civilian Population” from apply-
ing to naval warfare at sea provided there is nothing arising from the naval 
warfare that affects the civilian population or civilian objects on land. This 
limitation reflects the intention of the delegates at the Diplomatic Confer-
ence responsible for drafting AP I to avoid revising the law that applies to 
armed conflict at sea (and in the air). Sea (and air) warfare are, however, 
                                                                                                                      
19. Michael Bothe, 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts – Commentary, in 
THE LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 6, at 673, 762. 
20. LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra note 6, at 179 n.7. 
21. ELMAR RAUCH, THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 
FOR THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS AND THE 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: REPERCUSSIONS ON THE 
LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE 57–66, 127–31 (1984). 
22. The dispute between Henri Meyrowitz and Elmar Rauch occurred in the 1980s 
when these scholars argued about whether, or if, any particular elements of, AP I was ap-
plicable to naval warfare. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Submarine Operations and Inter-
national Law, in LAW AT WAR: THE LAW AS IT WAS AND THE LAW AS IT SHOULD BE 141, 













affected by a number of other treaties of “general application.”23 The con-
tinued application of other law is also reflected in the final sentence of Ar-
ticle 49(3), as well as the clear words of Article 49(4) which provide direct 
reference to “other international agreements . . . [and] . . . other rules of 
international law relating to the protection of civilian and civilian objects 
on land, at sea or in the air against the effects of hostilities.” 
Irrespective of whether Article 49 applies to the use of naval mines in 
IACs, much of what is contained in AP I’s section dealing with the protec-
tion of the civilian population24 reflects customary international law with a 
resultant wider applicability in times of armed conflict and therefore binds 
States in their maritime operations during IACs. This view is consistent 
with contemporary scholarly work, including the commentary contained in 
the San Remo Manual25 and many national LOAC manuals,26 and it is the 
approach taken in this article. The law of naval warfare and customary in-
ternational law are thus applicable in ensuring that the civilian population is 
                                                                                                                      
23. COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GE-
NEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 606 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & 
Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987) (citing the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and 
1925 Gas Protocol as examples) [hereinafter COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PRO-
TOCOLS]. 
24. AP I, supra note 18, Part IV. Part IV of AP I deals with the “Civilian Population” 
and Section 1 provides for “General Protection against Effects of Hostilities.” Articles 48–
67 inclusive are within Section 1. 
25. See, e.g., SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at 113–24. 
26. For example, the Australian Defence Force law of armed conflict publication pro-
vides, “[t]here is a fundamental rule that parties to a conflict must direct their operations only 
against military objectives. G. P. I expressly provides that the civilian population and civil-
ian objects are to be protected against attack.” Australian Defence Headquarters, ADDP 
06.4, Law of Armed Conflict ¶ 5.35 (2006), available at http://www.defence.gov 
.au/adfwc/Documents/DoctrineLibrary/ADDP/ADDP06.4-LawofArmedConflict.pdf 
(emphasis added) [hereinafter Australian Manual]. The United States, despite not being 
party to AP I, has a similar acknowledgement in U.S. MARINE CORPS & U.S. COAST 
GUARD, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/COMDTPUB P5800.7A, THE COMMANDER'S 
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS ¶ 8.3 (2007) [hereinafter COMMAND-
ER'S HANDBOOK]. See also the CANADIAN NATIONAL DEFENSE JOINT DOCTRINE MAN-
UAL B-GJ-005-104/FP-021 THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AT THE OPERATIONAL AND 
TACTICAL LEVELS ¶ 4.11 (2003) stating, “[t]he protection of civilians and civilian objects is 
a fundamental principle of the LOAC. Parties to a conflict have a duty to distinguish be-
tween civilians and combatants as well as between civilian objects and military objectives” 
and the UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT ¶ 5.3 (2004). All of these sources are available at the U.S. Naval War 













protected from being affected unduly by naval warfare, including the use of 
naval mines. 
AP I Article 35 sets out the “basic rules” in relation to the methods and 
means of warfare and stipulates that “[i]n any armed conflict, the right of 
the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not 
unlimited.” Article 35 is situated in a part of AP I that is not affected by 
Article 49(3) and, in any case, there is little doubt that the concept that is 
articulated in the Article is part of customary international law. Therefore, 
as a starting point, there are legal limits placed upon naval warfare in gen-
eral which flow by implication to the use of naval mines in particular as a 
result of the requirement for States involved in an IAC to adopt certain 
practices that ensure their actions are legally permissible. 
 
A. Weapons Law Restrictions on Mines 
  
The first question is whether any type of naval mine is banned outright un-
der weapons law. In particular, the development or eventual use of a nucle-
ar naval mine (if such mines presently exist)27 may be questionable from a 
number of legal perspectives. The ICJ considered the legality of the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons in its July 8, 1996 advisory opinion,28 in which 
the Court was unable to find a general or overall prohibition on the use of 
nuclear weapons by either treaty or customary international law.29 The 
Court carefully considered whether the use of nuclear weapons was com-
patible with the requirement of the laws applicable in international armed 
conflict on a number of grounds. Although the Court expressed serious 
reservations regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it was unable to reach a 
conclusion that such use was manifestly illegal in all circumstances.30 Per-
haps of particular significance to nuclear naval mines, the Court stated that 
                                                                                                                      
27. See, e.g., a report in 2011 that questioned whether North Korea was developing a 
nuclear naval mine capability. Jon Rabiroff, U.S Military Enters New Generation of Sea Mine 
Warfare, STARS AND STRIPES (May 9, 2011), http://www.stripes.com/news/u-s-military-
enters-new-generation-of-sea-mine-warfare-1.143170. See also a 2007 report that raised 
questions regarding whether China might consider developing a nuclear naval mine capa-
bility in the future. Andrew S. Erikson, Lyle J. Goldstein & William S. Murray, China’s 
Undersea Sentries, 9 UNDERSEA WARFARE, Winter 2007, at 11, 13–14, available at 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_33/china_2.html. 
28. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 41 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons]. 














it was not able to determine whether there might be circumstances when 
the use of small-yield tactical nuclear weapons might be legal.31 
A further issue is whether any treaty prohibits nuclear naval mines out-
right. The Seabed Arms Control Treaty32 might be relevant in this regard, 
though it is only applicable in limited areas and circumstances among the 
States that are party to it. Pursuant to Article I, the States that are party  
 
undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor 
and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as de-
fined in article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of 
mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other 
facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. 
 
This undertaking would directly affect a nuclear naval mine that offended 
the specific provisions in the Article, but not other types of nuclear naval 
mines which might be deployed in a different manner. 
The conclusion in relation to nuclear naval mines is that the use of 
such weapons in an IAC would attract legal issues similar to any other nu-
clear weapon. This result means that at present there is no absolute prohi-
bition on the use of nuclear naval mines that can be categorically asserted 
to exist. However, in the same way as any other naval mine could potential-
ly be deployed in a manner that does not conform with jus in bello obliga-
tions, it is clear that the use of nuclear naval mines could be problematic in 
some (if not many) discrete circumstances. 
  
B. Basic LOAC Principles and Perfidy 
 
This section analyzes the use of naval mines in IACs from the perspective 
of each of the four basic LOAC principles, namely distinction, proportion-
ality (including precautions), military necessity and humanity/unnecessary 
suffering. These principles are considered within the context of the rele-
vant provisions contained in AP I and customary international law. The 
application of the prohibition on perfidious conduct is also examined brief-
ly. 
 
                                                                                                                      
31. Nuclear Weapons, supra note 28, ¶ 94. 
32. Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other 
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil 












1. Distinction  
 
In naval warfare, the primary focus of operations is not against the individ-
ual sailors that are serving on a ship, but instead the platform itself is iden-
tified as the object that is being targeted. In terms of distinguishing be-
tween vessels that can legitimately be targeted and those that cannot, this 
platform-focus may actually simplify the requirement for the principle of 
distinction to be applied. 
However, it is noted in the San Remo Manual that there is no specific 
treaty provision that requires the principle of distinction to apply in naval 
warfare.33 AP I Article 48 requires States involved in an IAC to “distin-
guish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian 
objects and military objectives” and Article 51(4) prohibits indiscriminate 
attacks, but as noted above these Articles are in a section of AP I that does 
not apply to naval warfare. Nevertheless, there is a customary international 
law obligation to apply the principle of distinction in all aspects of warfare 
and that is the basis upon which the following discussion unfolds.34  
The notion that naval mines should be used in an IAC in a manner that 
ensures the principle of distinction is applied is perhaps unremarkable. As 
noted earlier, there is a customary international legal obligation to distin-
guish between military objectives and civilian objects in all types of warfare. 
In relation to naval mines, this customary obligation has been commented 
upon in both the Corfu Channel35 and Nicaragua36 cases. In these cases, the 
ICJ considered that a State which is aware of (or has caused) a naval mine 
danger is obliged to give some notification of its existence and location in 
order to protect the security of neutral/peaceful shipping as a matter of 
customary international law that States are bound to observe in peace and 
war.37 Although both of these cases dealt with situations where the laws 
                                                                                                                      
33. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at 114. 
34. Other provisions of AP I also have relevance to the principle of distinction (e.g., 
AP I, supra note 18, arts. 38, 41, 42, 44). 
35. Corfu Channel, supra note 8, especially at 22–23. 
36. Nicaragua, supra note 9, at 147–48. Note particularly the finding by the ICJ in rela-
tion to the failure of the United States to “make known the existence and location of the 
mines laid by it.” 
37. See JAMES J. BUSUTTIL, NAVAL WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND THE CONTEMPORARY 
LAW OF WAR 54–56 (1998) for a brief summary of portions of these cases that are rele-
vant to the use of naval mines in an IAC. See also LEVIE, MINE WARFARE AT SEA, supra 
note 6, at 166, where he asserts there can “be no quarrel” with the customary international 













applicable in international armed conflict did not apply, the ICJ’s finding 
that the principle of distinction was customary in nature means that it 
would clearly apply in IACs. This concept is also reflected in the San Remo 
Manual at paragraphs 83 and 84. 
Further support, if needed, for the relevance of the principle of distinc-
tion in relation to the use of naval mines in IACs can be obtained from 
consideration of the Second Geneva Convention of 194938 (GCII). Alt-
hough relating to the protection of victims of armed conflict, GCII Article 
34 stipulates that “[t]he protection to which hospital ships and sick-bays are 
entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, outside their hu-
manitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy.” 
So, for example, it could be readily argued that the deployment of naval 
mines in an IAC in a manner that does not discriminate between a military 
vessel and a civilian vessel (or a specially protected vessel such as a hospital 
ship) would not be lawful. This proposition is valid regardless of the type 
of mine deployed, as it is the manner in which the mine is used that is the 
key factor. Taking the example a little further, would it make a difference if 
a civilian/protected vessel that was carrying material that was inconsistent 
with its civilian/protected status was struck by a naval mine in an IAC? 
That is, would such an attack be contrary to the law of armed conflict, or, 
as is suggested by the San Remo Manual, would it be a question best ad-
dressed in terms of proportionality?39 
Because the focus in naval warfare is primarily on attacks against ob-
jects/platforms, rather than on individuals, a discussion of the principle of 
distinction is appreciably different from what may be experienced in the 
land environment. For instance, AP I Article 41 provides that “[a] person 
who is recognized or who, in the circumstances should be recognized to be 
hors de combat shall not be made the object of attack.” It is most unlikely that 
a naval mine would be able to distinguish such persons without external 
input. Further, due to the focus of naval warfare on the vessel in lieu of the 
person, the mere presence of someone who is hors de combat in a vessel that 
strikes a mine does not create a legal quandary for the State that has de-
ployed the mine. 
                                                                                                                      
38. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Ship-
wrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85. 
39. See SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at 124, where the suggestion is made that 
the sinking of the passenger liner Lusitania during the First World War was, with the bene-
fit of hindsight, a disproportionate act when a comparison is made between the material 












There are other considerations that can be looked at in terms of the 
discriminatory nature of naval mines. The use of free-floating mines is 
problematic unless they are directed against a military objective. There is 
also the additional problem of how to render such mines harmless once 
control over them is lost. Notification of the location(s) in which mines 
have been laid also assists with militating against any indiscriminate conse-
quence that might flow from the use of naval mines, especially if such noti-
fication results in “due regard” to the legitimate uses of the seas by vessels 
of those States uninvolved in a conflict. 
 
2. Proportionality (and Precautions in Attack) 
 
The definition of “attack” adopted in AP I is contained in Article 49(1). 
Although the treaty article is not directly applicable to naval warfare, the 
concept embodied in that article was adopted by the San Remo Manual with 
a modification to reflect the fact that in naval warfare it may be permissible 
to conduct an “act of violence” against shipping or aircraft of neutral 
States—not just an “adversary.” Both definitions are otherwise the same, 
and both envision that an attack may include an act that could be consid-
ered “defensive,” such as laying mines.40  
 AP I Article 57 describes “precautions in attack” that combatants 
are required to observe in relation to the civilian population, civilians and 
civilian objects. This article, however, is also contained within the section 
of AP I that specifically does not apply to warfare that occurs at sea. If the 
requirement articulated in AP I Article 57 (2)(b) that “an attack shall be 
cancelled or suspended if it becomes apparent that the objective is not a 
military one or is subject to special protection or that the attack may be 
expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage 
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated” is part of 
customary international law, it would be particularly problematic when na-
val mines are used in IACs. Some of this difficulty relates to the purpose 
for which naval mines might be deployed, such as sea control or area deni-
al, where the targeting or “attack” is not directed against any vessel or 
group of persons. Although it has been noted earlier that naval warfare is 
primarily concerned with targeting platforms, in the case of mine warfare it 
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law.” The COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS, supra note 23, at 602–3, alt-













may be difficult to determine that a naval mine has been directed at a par-
ticular vessel, except in some very limited and specific circumstances. This 
line of reasoning was certainly adopted in the Oil Platforms judgment.41  
The degree to which AP I Article 57 reflects customary international 
law is unclear due to the lack of State conformity regarding how Article 57 
is construed. Therefore, any realistic assessment of the influence of the 
principle of proportionality on the use of naval mines in IACs is only pos-
sible when placed in context. For example, in a situation where a warship 
or merchant vessel that is transporting a mixture of civilians and military 
personnel strikes a mine (e.g., during a noncombatant evacuation opera-
tion) and casualties are encountered, it may be difficult to question whether 
the deployment of the mine in the first place raised any proportionality is-
sues. This can be particularly difficult to resolve if the mines have been de-
ployed some time prior to the vessel actually striking the mine—how 
would the State that deployed the mines have any future knowledge regard-
ing the particulars of the persons that would be onboard any particular ves-
sel? Further, will the type of mine used determine how—and if—the prin-
ciple of proportionality is to be applied? This leaves an unresolved thresh-
old question in relation to whether there is a proportionality/precaution 
consideration that should be addressed prior to the initial deploying of na-
val mines, which, based on the reasoning applied in this article, could not 
possibly deal with all eventualities that may arise in an IAC. Accordingly, it 
is considered that the concept of proportionality, as it applies in the target-
ing equation in relation to the use of naval mines in IACs, is of limited rel-
evance. 
 
3. Military Necessity  
 
There is no specific provision in AP I that deals with the issue of military 
necessity in broad terms, although as Schmitt, among others, has noted, the 
inclusion of the “Martens clause” in Article 1(2) of AP I does “affirm its 
continuing applicability”42 in the sense that military necessity cannot be 
used as an overriding justification for taking military action in all circum-
stances. In a narrow sense, AP I Article 35(1), which was discussed earlier, 
has some relevance to military necessity in stating that the “right of the 
                                                                                                                      
41. Oil Platforms, supra note 10, especially at paragraphs 68–71.  
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Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlim-
ited.” Similarly, AP I Article 54(5), with the caveat regarding its applicability 
to naval warfare noted, recognizes that a State that is defending its territory 
against invasion may derogate from the requirement to protect objects that 
are indispensable to the survival of the civilian population in certain de-
fined circumstances. There may be some applicability to naval mine warfare 
in this area. For example widespread deployment of naval mines in territo-
rial waters and harbors of a State against enemy forces in a manner that 
actually indiscriminately targets all shipping (including ships transporting 
items that are indispensable to the survival of that State’s own population) 
with the intent of denying such items to the enemy force could be akin to 
undertaking terrestrial “scorched earth” action. The link, however, is tenu-
ous. 
Another issue with regard to military necessity concerns the question of 
whether States have a continual responsibility to assess whether there is an 
ongoing need for the mines to remain deployed after being laid. Alterna-
tively, does the notification requirement negate the obligation for continu-
ous reassessment of the need for the minefield? There is no clear answer to 
this issue. Further, does the laying of naval mines constitute an “attack”? 
Certain consequences arise if this is indeed the case. 
 
4. Humanity/Unnecessary Suffering  
 
The use of naval mines in IACs should occur in a manner that accords with 
basic principles of humanity and does not cause unnecessary suffering. AP 
I Article 35(2) states that “it is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles 
and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous inju-
ry or unnecessary suffering.” This article represents codification of one of 
the earliest principles that emerged in the modern law of armed conflict—
that causing unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury in armed conflict is 
not permitted. Its origins can be traced back to the St Petersburg Declara-
tion of 1868,43 which prohibited the use of exploding bullets against mem-
bers of the armed forces due to the horrific effect of such a weapon on a 
human body. Article 35(2) is applicable in naval warfare, but, as noted in 
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the San Remo Manual, its relevance in naval warfare is limited due to naval 
warfare’s focus on action against objects or platforms.44 
Although the circumstances of the Corfu Channel case did not arise from 
an IAC, the ICJ’s findings in the case were based upon “certain general and 
well recognized principles, namely: elementary consideration of humanity, 
even more exacting in peace than in war; the principles of the freedom of 
maritime communication; and every State’s obligation not to allow know-
ingly its territory to be used contrary to the rights of other States.”45 This 
statement by the ICJ gives strong support to the applicability of the princi-
ple of humanity regardless of whether or not mines are deployed in an IAC 
or in peacetime. It also creates a requirement for records to be kept of the 
location of minefields and the types of mine used, and clearance operations 
to be undertaken once hostilities have ceased.  
Accordingly, naval mines are only likely to breach this principle if they, 
on the facts in any particular circumstance, cause unnecessary suffering (for 
example, by containing projectiles of a type that are banned). Of course, 
these types of concerns apply to other weapons in just the same way as 
they would to mines, so in that sense there is nothing remarkable about the 
use of naval mines which would make them more likely to breach this 
principle than any other weapon. 
 
5. Perfidy 
One approach that has been taken to the question of the lawfulness of na-
val mines is to consider it from the perspective of perfidy. AP I Article 37 
sets out the criteria for, and examples of, perfidy. The key elements of per-
fidy are that it involves “inviting the confidence of an adversary . . . [in rela-
tion to] . . . protection under the rules of international law applicable in 
armed conflict.”46 So, for example, would it be perfidious to declare that 
mines had been laid when that was not actually the case? It is difficult to 
see how the use of naval mines in this manner, absent any other factor, 
would fit within the parameters of perfidy as there does not appear to be 
an attempt to obtain any “protection” from a declaration that a minefield 
exists. Such a declaration could be considered a legitimate ruse of naval 
warfare designed to divert enemy resources from the main war effort by 
                                                                                                                      
44. SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at 118. 
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having to spend time and effort in establishing whether or not mines have 
actually been deployed. The clandestine nature of naval mines, in so far as 
they are not easily detectable, does not support the conclusion that the use 
of naval mines is perfidious. As it is considered that the criteria set out in 
AP I Article 37 also reflect customary international law, which means that 
questions regarding the applicability of the article to naval warfare do not 
arise, the conclusion reached is that the mere declaration that naval mines 
have been laid does not, of itself, comprise a perfidious act. Accordingly, 
there would be no general prohibition on the use of naval mines in IACs 
on the basis of such use constituting an act of perfidy. 
 
C. Other Legal Rules which Continue to Apply during an IAC 
 
As noted earlier, in addition to consideration of the basic LOAC principles, 
there are a number of other legal regimes that might have an impact on the 
use of naval mines in IACs. For example, Article 1 of 1907 Hague Conven-
tion IX47 states that “[a] place cannot be bombarded solely because auto-
matic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbor.” However, the 
contemporary relevance of this provision in IACs is probably not high. The 
next section of this article will explore a number of legal regimes that have 
some application in IACs to evaluate their impact on the use of naval 
mines in such conflicts. 
 
1. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC)  
 
The LOSC is primarily concerned with peaceful (and peacetime) uses of 
the seas48 and therefore does not contain any specific provisions that di-
rectly regulate naval warfare in general or the use of naval mines in IACs in 
particular. Nevertheless, there are some aspects of the LOSC that do have 
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48. LOSC, supra note 15, art. 301. 
49. A brief summary of the key impact of the LOSC on naval warfare is provided in 













a. Coastal State Mining Activities  
 
A State may legitimately deploy naval mines in both its internal waters and 
territorial sea, but there would be a clear onus placed upon that State de-
ploying the mines to ensure that such action does not result in damage to 
shipping that legitimately uses those sea areas.50 Because foreign-flagged 
vessels have no right of passage through a State’s internal waters (except 
for the right of non-suspendable innocent passage in archipelagic waters), 
any passage that is undertaken is at the discretion of the State. Within in-
ternal waters a State has sovereignty to conduct activities as it pleases with 
very few restrictions,51 including, if it so desires, the deployment of naval 
mines.  
In the territorial sea, the coastal State has duties52 and rights53 under the 
LOSC that would affect the deployment of naval mines, and vessels of for-
eign States do have a right of innocent passage.54 In particular, if mines 
were deployed there would be questions regarding whether the actions of 
the State met the criteria stipulated in the LOSC for taking action “without 
discrimination in form or fact among foreign ships, [to] suspend temporari-
ly in specified areas of its territorial sea the innocent passage of foreign 
ships if . . . essential for the protection of its security, including weapons 
exercises.”55 If innocent passage is suspended, the suspension may take ef-
fect only after notification has been provided to international shipping by 
the coastal State. 
If a State wished to deploy naval mines in areas outside its internal wa-
ters or territorial sea, then its ability to do so becomes more limited the far-
ther the location is from its coast. The San Remo Manual notes that, during 
an armed conflict, such use of naval mines for a legitimate military purpose 
consistent with the rules of international humanitarian law is permissible.56 
                                                                                                                      
50. It is noted there would be an analogous right of archipelagic States to deploy 
mines in their own archipelagic waters, subject to certain limitations in relation to archipe-
lagic sea lane passage, but for reasons of simplicity this right will not be addressed in this 
section of this article.  
51. One such restriction would be to ensure that the deployment of naval mines did 
not lead to a circumstance whereby fundamental human rights, such as the right not to be 
arbitrarily deprived of life, were breached. 
52. LOSC, supra note 15, art. 24. 
53. Id., art. 25. 
54. Id., art. 17. 
55. Id., art. 25(3). 












This position is also reflected in several key national law of armed conflict 
handbooks.57 Outside of an armed conflict, the position is more ambigu-
ous. Delegates at the workshop which generated this forum were unclear 
whether the freedom of the high seas included a freedom to lay mines. 
 
b. Other States’ Mining Activities in the Territorial Sea   
 
As noted earlier, the mining of another State’s territorial sea in the period 
prior to an IAC would be a violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. It 
would also be a violation of the LOSC since the right of vessels of a for-
eign State to passage through the territorial waters of another State is re-
stricted to innocent passage and the deployment of naval mines during 
such passage would clearly not be “innocent.”58 
The right of innocent passage exists for all ships in the territorial sea, 
with the stipulation that this passage not be “prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State.”59 LOSC Article 19(2) provides a list 
of such activities, including, inter alia: 
 
(a) any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity or political independence of the coastal State, or in 
any other manner in violation of the principles of internation-
al law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the 
defence or security of the coastal State; 
. . .  
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of any military de-
vice. 
 
Clearly, a vessel of a State that was engaged in either minelaying or mine 
clearing operations in the territorial sea of another State would not be able 
                                                                                                                      
57. For example, the Australian law of armed conflict doctrine publication provides, 
“Mines may only be used in armed conflict at sea for legitimate military purposes, includ-
ing the denial of sea areas to the enemy.” Australian Manual, supra note 26, ¶ 6.27. Similar 
provisions exist in the equivalent U.S., UK and German publications. COMMANDER'S 
Handbook, supra note 26, ¶ 9.23; UK MANUAL, supra note 26, ¶ 13.52 (2004); FEDERAL 
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (German), HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS MANUAL 
¶ 379 (1st ed. 2002).  
58. See LOSC, supra note 15, art. 19(2). 













to claim that its passage in the territorial sea was innocent. This issue was 
also addressed in the Corfu Channel case.60 
 
c. Mining in International Straits and Archipelagic Sea Lanes 
 
Other provisions of the LOSC perhaps have greater significance. For ex-
ample, in relation to straits used for international navigation and the regime 
of transit passage through such straits, Article 44 (and Article 54 in relation 
to archipelagic States) provides that “States bordering straits shall not ham-
per transit passage and shall give appropriate publicity to any danger to 
navigation or overflight within or over the strait of which they have 
knowledge. There shall be no suspension of transit passage.” As States 
bordering straits are not permitted to hamper transit passage (or archipelag-
ic sea lanes passage through archipelagic waters), the use of naval mines in 
such straits during an IAC would be unlawful if no provision was made for 
neutral vessels to access safe alternative routes that are of similar conven-
ience. Indeed, this issue, although pre-dating the 1982 LOSC, was one of 
the matters raised by Albania during the Corfu Channel case.61 There are 
practical issues involved in determining how such routes would be estab-
lished, especially if mines are deployed by aircraft and/or by a State with 
limited capability to provide for safety of neutral vessels, but the obligation 
in IACs nevertheless remains extant.62 
 
d. Due Regard Requirements for Mining 
 
The final aspect of the LOSC that will be addressed is the requirement for 
States to have “due regard” to the rights of other States, as articulated in 
LOSC Article 87: 
 
1. The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal or land-
locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the con-
ditions laid down by this Convention and by other rules of inter-
national law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and land-
locked States: 
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61. Id., especially at 27–31. 
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(a) freedom of navigation; 
(b) freedom of overflight; 
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part 
VI; 
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations 
permitted under international law, subject to Part VI; 
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in sec-
tion 2; 
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII. 
 
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard 
for the interests of other States in their exercise of the free-
dom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights 
under this Convention with respect to activities in the Area.63 
 
Although LOSC Article 88 provides “[t]he high seas shall be preserved 
for peaceful purposes,” it must be read in light of LOSC Article 87, both in 
terms of the applicability of “other rules of international law” (such as the 
law of naval warfare) and the requirement for “due regard” to be given to 
the rights of other legitimate users of the high seas. Accordingly, the de-
ployment of naval mines on the high seas may not be used as a means of 
implicitly asserting sovereignty as this would directly contravene both 
LOSC Article 87 and the prohibition on the threat or use of force in Arti-
cle 2(4) of the UN Charter.64 High seas minefields must therefore be care-
fully limited to the military purpose for which they have been established. 
 
2. 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention (and its 1954 and 
1999 Protocols) 
 
Protection of cultural property during an IAC is an area that has emerged 
in importance in the period following the conclusion of the Second World 
War.65 This emergence is most notably reflected in the entry into force of 
the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and its two Protocols.66  
                                                                                                                      
63. Emphasis added. 
64. LOSC, supra note 15, art. 301 is also relevant. 
65. See DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 43, at 371–73, for a review of 
the historical background of the protection of cultural property in armed conflict that led 
to the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention being adopted. 
66. Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Con-
flict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague Cultural Property Convention]; 













A particular aspect of that Convention to be considered in terms of its 
application to the use of naval mines in IACs is the transportation of cul-
tural property found in Chapter III. One of the obvious methods of trans-
portation of cultural property is by sea, which raises the possibility that 
special responsibilities may arise for both a State that uses naval mines in 
an IAC and the State that transports cultural property once notification of 
a naval mine danger has occurred. These obligations would arise provided 
that the requirements specified in the Convention’s annexed Regulations 
were followed.67 In the case of a State seeking to deploy naval mines, there 
may be a scenario whereby the State might be prevented from such action 
if there has been notification that cultural property is being transported 
through a specified maritime area. Conversely, if a State has deployed naval 
mines and advised the location of the minefield, there may be an obligation 
on the State transporting cultural property by sea to avoid the area in which 
the minefield is located so that the cultural property being transported is 
not subject to the possibility of being damaged if the transporting vessel is 
struck by a mine. 
There is also the possibility that a further special caution might need to 
be taken with underwater cultural property that would prevent a naval 
minefield being laid at all where there could be an effect on items that are 
underwater and fit within the definition of cultural heritage in the Under-
water Cultural Heritage Convention.68 However, in relation to the protec-
tion of sunken warships under that Convention, Roach notes there are 
considerable inconsistencies that arise.69 Therefore, further legal analysis 
would be needed to determine whether mines can be deployed in a location 
where a sunken naval vessel is located.70 This aspect is especially relevant in 
                                                                                                                      
1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 
212. 
67. See Regulations for the Execution of the Convention for the Protection of Cultur-
al Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, annexed to Hague Cultural Property Conven-
tion, supra note 66, arts. 17–19. See also the discussion supra Part III.C.1 with regard to the 
impact of the LOSC. 
68. Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, Nov. 2, 2001, 
2562 U.N.T.S. 3. 
69. J. Ashley Roach, Warships, Sunken, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 33–42 (2011), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil 
/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e444?rskey=B80QXA&result=1&prd=OPIL.  
70. Id., where a comprehensive summary of the legal status of sunken warships can be 
found. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 62, at 111–12. It is also noted that 












circumstances where the sunken vessel is considered a war grave due to the 
presence of the bodies of deceased sailors in the vessel. 
 
3. Environmental Considerations 
 
Article 1 of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) pro-
vides that “[e]ach State Party to this Convention undertakes not to engage 
in military or any other hostile use of environmental modification tech-
niques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of 
destruction, damage or injury to any other State Party.”71 Article 2 provides 
“[a]s used in Article 1, the term ‘environmental modification techniques’ 
refers to any technique for changing—through the deliberate manipulation of 
natural processes—the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, in-
cluding its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or of outer 
space.”72 
While it is difficult to envision any direct application of ENMOD to 
the use of naval mines in IACs in the context of known weapon capabili-
ties, indirect consequences could create issues. Consider, for example, an 
environmental effect such as a tsunami or tidal wave caused by the explo-
sion of a nuclear mine or a large number of conventional naval mines ex-
ploding simultaneously. The consequences of such an event could be cata-
strophic in terms of the effect on the land environment and, consequently, 
the civilian population. Although this example may seem somewhat far-
fetched, one of the roles of those who plan and execute military operations 
is to consider not only the likely outcomes of their actions but also to con-
template some of the more obscure outcomes that may eventuate. 
The protection of the marine environment is extensively dealt with in 
the LOSC73 and is also addressed in AP I Article 35(3), which prohibits the 
employment of methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may 
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the nat-
ural environment. One example that might be considered in this context is 
                                                                                                                      
the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 (Australia) and the Protection of Military Remains Act 
1986 (United Kingdom). 
71. Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Envi-
ronmental Modification Techniques 1108 U.N.T.S. 151. 
72. Emphasis added. 
73. The SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 6, at 82, notes there are nearly fifty articles in 













the use of naval mines in a manner that results in the destruction of a vital 
area of coral reef or an endangered marine species that was predominately 
located in a particular maritime area. The provisions of the LOSC that deal 
with the conservation of living resources in the exclusive economic zone 
(Articles 61–67 in particular) might be especially relevant in terms of the 
impact these provisions could have on the decision to deploy mines. While 
some may consider this issue to be improbable, in certain circumstances 
(such as where the potential depletion of an entire fish stock could occur), 
this aspect of the use of naval mines in an IAC might need to be factored 
into the planning process. 
 
4. 1980 Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Convention and 
Its Protocols 
 
The CCW Convention consists of a framework convention74 and five pro-
tocols.75 Protocol II (1980) and Protocol II (Amended) (1996) deal with 
“prohibitions or restrictions on the use of mines, booby-traps and other 
devices” and therefore might be, at first glance, relevant to the use of naval 
mines in IACs. However, Article 1 of Protocol II provides, “[t]his Protocol 
relates to the use on land of the mines, booby-traps and other devices de-
fined herein, including mines laid to interdict beaches, waterway crossings 
or river crossings, but does not apply to the use of anti-ship mines at sea or 
in inland waterways.” 
In relation to the application of the CCW Convention to naval warfare 
at all, Levie states that “it should be obvious that the members of the Dip-
lomatic Conference that drafted this Convention and its three Protocols 
intended to avoid completely the drafting of any rules applicable to mari-
time warfare and particularly to the use of mines in riverine or ocean war-
fare.”76 Levie also notes that “sometimes commentators attempt to inter-
pret the provisions of a convention directly contrary to the specifically ex-
pressed intentions of the drafters,”77 which he uses as justification for in-
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Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter CCW Convention]. 
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1980. 
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clusion of discussion regarding the CCW Convention in his book, includ-
ing the claim that the Convention is “exclusively concerned with warfare 
on land.”78 Another commentator has adopted a less rigid approach, noting 
the limitation on the application of Protocol II to land warfare, but sug-
gesting that a number of the “provisions might be cited for analogous 
treatment for naval warfare,” such as the ban on the indiscriminate use of 
mines, restrictions on the use of mines in close proximity to civilian areas, 
the requirement for mines to be directed against military objectives and the 
need for warnings to be issued.79  
So, returning to the perhaps vexing issue of whether there is scope for 
the CCW Convention, and in particular Protocol II, to have relevance to 
the use of naval mines in IACs, the question should be asked whether there 
is any merit in the suggestion that Protocol II would apply, for example, 
during a beach landing where amphibious vessels are not, sensu stricto, “at 
sea” since the vessel is temporarily not afloat.80 This suggestion is not sup-
ported, as such a claim is not consistent with the clear language or intent of 
Protocol II.81 In ordinary naval parlance, a vessel is “at sea” when it is not 
alongside a pier in port or at anchor in a harbor. This condition certainly 
applies to a vessel engaged in an amphibious operation where the reason 
for the vessel resting on the seabed forms part of its operational profile. 
Further support for this point of view can be obtained by considering the 
situation where a submarine is resting on the ocean floor while submerged. 
There can be no doubt that in this case; the submarine is not “at sea.” 
Finally, for completeness, mention is made of the 1997 Ottawa Con-
vention82 only in so far as to emphasize that it deals with anti-personnel 
landmines only and therefore has no relevance to the use of naval mines at 
all. 
 
                                                                                                                      
land objectives) despite the statements on [sic] the draftsmen, and the specific provisions 
of the Protocol, to the contrary,” referring to RAUCH, supra note 21, at 131. 
78. Id.  
79. George K. Walker, State Practice Following World War II: 1945–1990, in THE LAW OF 
NAVAL WARFARE: TARGETING ENEMY MERCHANT SHIPPING 121, 152 (Richard J. Grun-
awalt ed., 1993) (Vol. 65, U.S. Naval War College International Law Studies). 
80. See BUSUTTIL, supra note 37, at 13. 
81. In terms of the LOSC, it is noted that tidal range in the intertidal zone can affect 
where the “sea” lies in any given period so that at low tide an area might be void of water 
while at high tide the same area will be submerged. 













5. Human Rights 
 
A fundamental issue to consider in terms of IACs is the extraterritorial ju-
risdictional basis upon which international human rights law might apply.83 
In this regard, there are differences that exist among States.84 For example, 
in the case of the United Kingdom, the issue was addressed recently in the 
UK Supreme Court, which followed the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights85 in recognizing that an extraterritorial application 
of human rights law can exist when a State “exercises authority and control 
over an individual”86 outside the United Kingdom. By way of contrast, the 
United States’ view is that “most human rights treaties apply to persons 
living in the territory of the United States, and not to any person with 
whom agents of our government deal outside of our borders.”87 It is there-
fore possible that if two States deploy naval mines in an area of the high 
seas during an IAC, one of those States may have to consider the applica-
tion of human rights law in relation to both its own forces and others that 
might be affected by the mines, while the second State might not have the 
same obligations. 
At the macro level, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (ICCPR)88 has general application to the use of naval mines in 
IACs in terms of the stipulation in Article 6 that “[e]very human being has 
the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” In times of armed conflict, this right 
continues to exist, however, it must be interpreted through the lens of 
LOAC, the lex specialis. Thus, as noted by the ICJ, “whether a particular loss 
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of life, through the use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered 
an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can 
only be decided by reference to the law applicable in armed conflict and 
not deduced from the terms of the Covenant itself.”89 Therefore, the em-
ployment of naval mines would be precluded in an IAC if such use did not 
discriminate between legitimate military targets and civilian personnel or 
objects in a manner that complements prohibitions under the LOAC. Un-
surprisingly, in a convention that is focused on fundamental human rights, 
there is no specific application of the ICCPR to naval mines in IACs, but 
the general principle is applicable. 
In terms of judicial decisions, the Al-Skeini case90 has seen a broadening 
of the definition of “effective control” that has been deemed to trigger the 
application of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) in 
armed conflicts for European Union participants.91 There are, of course, 
many circumstances in which parties to an IAC laying naval mines offen-
sively outside their own territory would not be exercising effective control 
so as to prompt the application of the ECHR. However, those States that 
are bound by the ECHR and which lay defensive minefields within their 
own territorial waters, are likely to fulfill the effective control criteria, and 
therefore need to consider whether their actions are in accordance with 
European human rights standards. It is not suggested that the principle that 
arose from Al-Skeini forms part of customary international law, or other-
wise applies to States that are not subject to the ECHR, but nevertheless 
the decision represents another step along the way of growing human 
rights jurisprudence that influences (some might say dangerously) action in 
IACs.92 
Finally in relation to human rights, it might simply be the case that ap-
plication of “elementary considerations of humanity” to the use of naval 
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mines in an IAC provides sufficient basis to ensure that basic human rights 
are respected.93 
 
6. International Criminal Law 
 
One issue that has not been examined in any detail is the potential interna-
tional criminal law consequences that may arise out of the use of naval 
mines in IACs. It is not difficult to envision uses that may, just as is the 
case with any other area of the law of armed conflict, contravene applicable 
law. In the most extreme cases, naval mines could be used in a manner that 
would constitute a grave breach of one of the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
or AP I. For example, if naval mines are deployed in a manner that is indis-
criminate with the result that “wilful” killing of civilians is alleged to have 
occurred, this might be cause for an action to deal with a grave breach of 
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention.94  
Similarly, in terms of command responsibility, the use of naval mines in 
a manner that shows a blatant disregard for the responsibilities that are 
placed on a commander when planning and executing a military operation 
may find that commander being prosecuted for any consequential LOAC 
breach committed by forces under his/her command. For example, if 
mines are deployed so that the probability of targeting a military objective 
is extremely low (such as being laid in a harbor where there are no warships 
ordinarily stationed), but the probability of targeting vessels carrying civil-
ians is high (due to the use of ferries for regular commuter traffic in a busy 
harbor), there use likely would not comply with LOAC requirements.  
 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
The theme that emerges from this article is that there is no contemporary 
legal challenge to the use or existence of naval mines per se as evidenced by 
the three key ICJ decisions95 that have examined circumstances involving 
the use of naval mines; in none was there any assertion that the use of na-
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val mines is manifestly unlawful in all circumstances. Rather, there are con-
siderations that arise from the type of mine that is used (for example, a nu-
clear naval mine) and the method in which naval mines are employed in 
international armed conflict. Violations of the laws of armed conflict can 
arise as a consequence of deficiencies in either case, and those involved in 
international armed conflict must contemplate how their activities can be 
legitimately conducted in a way that does not result in breaches of the law. 
It is important to keep in mind, however, that there is an inherent risk that 
during IACs mistakes will inadvertently occur, and these can sometimes be 
the result of completely unforeseen events that even the most prudent level 
of planning could not predict or prevent. 
The key principles that are stipulated in Hague VIII concerning the 
manner in which automatic submarine contact mines may be used have 
transcended into customary international law in relation to the use of all 
naval mines, regardless of the type of device that is actually deployed. 
However, it has already been seen that Hague VIII provides a very limited 
rule set. It is clear from the foregoing analysis that separate customary law 
rules of IAC, as well as broader international (and, possibly, domestic) legal 
considerations, operate to restrict the use of mines in circumstances where 
Hague VIII was silent.  
While it might be preferable to have a contemporary treaty governing 
the use of all types of naval mines for the sake of being able to refer to a 
clear legal regime that is relevant to the twenty-first century, the impact of 
customary international law and “other legal limits” on the use of naval 
mines in international armed conflict provide a far more robust regime 
governing naval mine warfare than might be gleaned from an analysis of 
Hague VIII alone. 
 
